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ENFORCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS BY DIMINISHING PRIVACY: 
HOW THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE 
AGREEMENT JEOPARDIZES THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY1 
 
Alberto Cerda Silva
2
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Enforcing the law in the digital environment is one of the main 
challenges of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).  In 
order to enforce the intellectual property law, unlike previous 
international agreements on the matter, ACTA attempts to set forth 
provisions concerned with privacy and personal data.  Special 
provisions refer to law enforcement in the digital environment; 
ACTA would require the adoption of domestic law to allow 
identifying supposed infringers and, consequently, the collaboration 
of the online service providers (OSPs) with rights holders.  However, 
those provisions raise some human rights concerns, particularly as 
related to the right to privacy of Internet users and the right to 
protection of their personal data.   
This paper describes the ACTA provisions on the rights to privacy 
and personal data protection and compares them with domestic 
privacy law in the context of intellectual property enforcement, 
particularly those of the United States (U.S.) and the European Union 
(EU).  The underlying hypothesis of this paper is that the ACTA 
provisions do not harmonize the domestic laws in force, instead it 
creates a new standard, beyond any domestic law; the full 
implementation of those provisions would require modifications in 
the domestic law, which seriously undermines the right to privacy and 
                                                 
1
At the time this paper was researched and written, the July 1, 2010 draft of ACTA 
was the most recent draft of the text.  Any references to “the most recent text” and related 
analysis refer to the July 1, 2010 draft.  After this paper was submitted for publication, a 
new draft of ACTA was leaked on Aug. 25, 2010.  This paper may be revised by the author 
to reflect changes made by the Aug. 25, 2010 draft text. 
2
 Professor, University of Chile Law School. 
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protection to personal data.  Therefore, this paper calls for some 
modifications in the current text of ACTA in order to reach an 
adequate balance between intellectual property enforcement and the 
aforementioned rights to privacy and personal data protection. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
Globalization, digitalization, and the Internet have been the main 
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challenges for intellectual property since the turn of the century.  
Globalization has reduced the cost of transportation and communication 
across the world;
3
 the digitalization of content has facilitated and increased 
the flow of copyrightable works;
4
 and, the Internet, which is the paradigm 
of global services, has allowed the cross-border transfer of digital works in 
seconds.  As a result of those phenomena, creating and maintaining an 
adequate protection for intellectual property rights has required several 
modifications of the law on the international level, especially in copyright. 
International instruments on intellectual property have focused their 
efforts on achieving the harmonization of domestic laws by adopting 
common standards related to the scope, the rights, the duration, and 
limitations of intellectual property rights.  However, to some extent, two 
issues have been postponed in the international fora:  the enforcement of 
those rules and its adequacy to the digital environment.  These are the main 
topics addressed by ACTA with the goal of addressing the counterfeiting 
and piracy of goods that affect commercial interests. 
This paper analyzes the provisions of ACTA that unsuccessfully attempt 
to balance the protection of intellectual property rights and the fundamental 
rights of users, especially those related to the right to privacy and the right 
to protection of personal data.  
 
II. ACTA‟S PURPOSES AND PRIVACY PROVISIONS 
 
According to statements of governments that have taken part in the 
negotiation of ACTA, the initiative aims to establish international standards 
for enforcing intellectual property rights to target more efficiently the 
increasing problem of counterfeiting and piracy that significantly affects 
commercial interests, rather than the activities of common people.
5
  
However, the analysis of the privacy provisions of ACTA shows a different 
                                                 
3
  JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 27 et seq. (2002). 
4
  NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995) (explaining the inadequacy of 
current intellectual property regulation, originally designed to protect analog works, 
to protect digital works).  The cause of this inadequacy would be the whole difference 
between atoms and bits. 
5
  See, G8 Toyako Declaration on World Economy, July 8, 2008, ¶ 17, available at 
http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2008/July/20080708102050bpuh0.982113
1.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).  G8 includes the government of Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  See also 
Press Release, European Commission, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement:  
European Commission Welcomes Release of Negotiation Documents (April 21, 
2010), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=552 
(expressing that ACTA‟s purpose is to “address large-scale infringements of 
intellectual property rights” and “no means lead to a limitation of civil liberties or to 
„harassment‟ of consumers.”). 
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concern, and they seem to focus more on enforcing the law against citizens 
rather than against criminal organizations and/or serious crime. 
The negotiations of ACTA have not taken place in any multilateral fora, 
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), but they have involved several countries.  
In fact, currently, the negotiations include Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, the 
U.S., and the European Union. 
From 2008 to August 2010, there have been ten rounds of negotiations, 
which have been conducted mainly in secret.  Only after enormous pressure 
from civil society organizations and the European Parliament
6
 was there an 
official public release of the proposed text of the agreement, after the 8th 
round, in April 2010.
7
  Unfortunately, in spite of the requirement of 
transparency, there has not been any new public release of the negotiations. 
However, there are leaked versions of the draft of the agreement, one before 
and another after the official public release, in January and July 2010, 
respectively.
8
  All those documents permit viewing a mosaic of the progress 
during the negotiations, particularly the leaked versions of the agreement, 
since they, unlike the official release, include the positions of negotiators by 
country and uncensored text of footnotes.  Given its high verisimilitude and 
updated content, this paper is based on the last consolidated text available 
from July 1, 2010; therefore, all the references to the ACTA text here and 
elsewhere are to that document, except as otherwise mentioned. 
The current text of ACTA is structured in six chapters that include 
initial provisions and definitions,
9
 the proposed legal framework for 
                                                 
6
  Resolution of 10 March 2010 on the Transparency and State of Play of the ACTA 
Negotiations, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA-PROV(2010)0058, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-
2010-0058+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN. 
7
 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Consolidated Text Prepared for Public Release 
Public Predecisional/Deliberative Draft:  April 21, 2010, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT 
DATABASE, http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Official 
Consolidated ACTA Text Prepared for Public Release, April 21, 2010” hyperlink) 
[hereinafter ACTA Draft – Apr. 21, 2010]  
8
  Before the 7th round, in January 2010, was released the first leaked version of the 
agreement. See, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Consolidated Text, Informal 
Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, January 18, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Jan. 
18, 2010].  Immediately after the 9th round, in July 2010, was released the second 
one.  See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Consolidated Text, Informal 
Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, 1 July 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Jul. 1, 
2010].  All versions, official and leaked, are available at the PIJIP IP Enforcement 
Database, http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta. 
9
  ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, Ch. One:  Initial Provisions and 
Definitions, arts. 1.1 to 1.X. 
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enforcement of intellectual property rights,
10
 norms about international 
cooperation,
11
 enforcement practices and mechanisms,
12
 an institutional 
arrangement,
13
 and final provisions related to the effects of the agreement.
14
  
For purpose of this paper, it is necessary to explain with some detail those 
norms related to the legal framework for enforcing the law, which includes 
provisions on civil liability, border measures, criminal enforcement, and 
special measures related to technological enforcement of intellectual 
property in the digital environment. 
In relation to civil enforcement, ACTA requires parties to have available 
civil procedures to enforce rights, including provisions about injunctions, 
damages, other remedies, access to information related to infringement and 
infringers, and provisional measures.
15
 
The section related to border measures requires the adoption of certain 
mechanisms by parties when goods are suspected of infringing intellectual 
property rights, except in case of di minimis infringement.
16
  Those 
measures can be adopted under application of the rights holders and also ex 
officio.
17
  Parties shall provide safeguard measures, procedures to determine 
infringement and remedies, reasonable enforcement fees, and the disclosure 
of information about infringements and infringers.
18
  
Related to criminal enforcement, ACTA attempts to conceptualize 
criminal offenses, to extend liability to legal persons and inciting conducts, 
and to adopt criteria for penalties and sanctions.
19
  As to these points, the 
draft still shows an important lack of agreement among the different 
proposals.  ACTA includes provisions about seizure, confiscation/forfeiture, 
and destruction of suspected counterfeit (trademark) or pirated (copyright) 
goods.
20
  Finally, ACTA requires parties to allow ex officio criminal 
enforcement and to ensure the rights of the defendants and third parties.
21
 
The section about technological enforcement of intellectual property in 
the digital environment
22
 is by far the most innovative of the instrument, 
since several of the issues raised by those provisions never have been 
                                                 
10
  Id.  Ch. Two: Legal Framework for Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 
2.X to 2.18. 
11
  Id.  Ch. Three: International Cooperation, arts. 3.1 to 3.3. 
12
  Id.  Ch. Four: Enforcement Practices, arts. 4.1 to 4.5. 
13
  Id.  Ch. Five: Institutional Arrangement, arts. 5.1 to 5.3. 
14
  Id.  Ch. Six: Final Provisions, arts. 6.1 to 6.7. 
15
  Id. arts. 2.1 to 2.5. 
16
  Id. art. 2.X. 
17
  Id. art. 2.7. 
18
  Id. arts. 2.9 to 2.13. 
19
  Id. arts. 2.14 and 2.15. 
20
  Id. art. 2.16. 
21
  Id. art. 2.17. 
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regulated in previous international instruments on intellectual property, not 
even the WIPO Internet Treaties.
23
  Basically, this section includes 
provisions about the limitation of liability related to online material for 
online service providers and the protection for effective technological 
measures and rights management information.  This section, which seems 
drafted as an updated version of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA),
24
 still shows an evident absence of agreement among the parties. 
In fact, by the tenth round of negotiations, almost all the articles are in 
brackets, several of them have different proposals, and the section contains 
more footnotes than any other. 
Different from previous international agreements on intellectual 
property, ACTA includes explicit references to privacy and data protection.  
Neither the Berne Convention nor the Paris Convention, which are the main 
international instruments on copyright and patents, makes any reference to 
privacy or data protection.  By its part, the TRIPS Agreement only refers to 
them indirectly, by allowing WTO members to provide that the judicial 
authorities could order the intellectual property infringer to inform the 
identity of third persons involved in infringements.
25
  In addition, the 
TRIPS Agreement includes some provisions that raise secrecy and 
confidentiality, but they look at commercial, business, and manufacturing 
information, not at personal information.
26
 
ACTA calls attention to privacy and data protection in several of its 
drafted provisions by:  drafting a provision to ensure that nothing in it 
detracts from domestic legislation regarding protection of personal 
privacy;
27
 reserving domestic law that regulates processing of personal data, 
in accessing or disclosing personal information in civil enforcement
28
 and 
                                                                                                                            
22
  Id. art. 2.18. 
23
  The World Intellectual Property Organization adopted both the Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty and the Copyright Treaty, also known as the WIPO Internet 
Treaties, which provide protection for works in digital environment and regulates the 
technological protective measures, on December 20, 1996. 
24
  Adopted in 1998, the DMCA amended the U.S. Copyright Act, Title 17 of the U.S. 
Code, to comply with the WIPO Internet Treaties. However, beyond the purpose of 
the mentioned treaties, it also included provisions related to limitations on the liability 
of online service providers for copyright infringement.  See, Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, codified in scattered sections of 
17 U.S.C. [hereinafter DMCA]. 
25
  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], art. 47. 
26
  Id. arts. 34 and 39 (referring to secret information). See also id. arts. 40, 42, 43, 57 
and 63 (referring to confidential information). 
27
  ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 1.4. 
28
  Id. art. 2.4. 
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border measures;
29
 implicitly referring to the rights of defendants and third 
parties in enforcement;
30
 excluding the monitoring of user monitoring by 
ISPs as a condition to enjoy the limitations on liability relating to material 
online;
31
 requiring ISPs to provide expeditious information on the identity 
of subscribers to right holders in claims of copyright or related rights 
infringement;
32
 and adopting privacy as a possible limit to transparency 
and/or publication of enforcement procedures and practices.
33
 
As the Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
Marc Rotenberg, correctly states, intellectual property rights never have 
conferred per se the right to identify users.
34
  However, because enforcing 
intellectual property rights, particularly in the digital environment, requires 
identifying supposed infringers, ACTA has been forced to include the 
aforementioned provisions about privacy and personal data protection.  
They seem intended to balance the competing interests:  reaching an 
appropriate level of enforcement for intellectual property and, at the same 
time, guaranteeing an adequate level of protection for privacy and personal 
data.  Unlike intellectual property rights, which are “private rights,”35 
getting adequate protection for the rights to privacy and personal data is 
important not just for individual interests, but also to protect societal values, 
because they are essential in the very idea of democracy and as safeguards 
of human rights.
36
 
In the following pages, this paper briefly analyzes the main challenges 
that the current text of ACTA creates for privacy and data protection, 
nascent provisions for an international treaty about intellectual property.  
This paper focus mostly on the context of intellectual property enforcement 
in the digital environment, but its conclusions may be applied generally to 
online and offline activities.   
III. CRITICISMS OF ACTA‟S PRIVACY PROVISIONS 
 
                                                 
29 
 Id. art. 2.13. 
30 
   Id. art. 2.X. 
31
  Id. art. 2.18.3 bis. 
32
  Id. art. 2.18.3 ter. 
33
  Id. art. 4.3. 
34
  The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and Privacy Issues:  Hearing on 
H.R. 2281Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer 
Protection of the H. Comm. on Int‟l Relations (Jun. 5, 1998) (testimony and statement 
of Marc Rotenberg, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center).  
35
  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 25, Preamble. 
36
  See Frances S. Grodzinsky & Herman T. Tavali, P2P Networks and the Verizon v. 
RIAA Case: Implications for Personal Privacy and Intellectual Property, 7 ETHICS 
AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 243 (2005). 
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Analyzing the current text of ACTA poses some challenges.  First, most 
of the consolidated text is still in brackets, which means it is under 
discussion and there is not an agreement yet.  Second, several provisions 
present different proposed options, some of them with important 
dissimilarities.  Third, while some footnotes clearly evidence the 
negotiators‟ intent,37 others seem an authoritative interpretation of the text,38 
still others look like they are primarily intended to reserve the agreement‟s 
implementation to the domestic law,
39
 and even a few of them are directly 
prescriptive.
40
  Those facts make it complex to identify the real intent of the 
negotiating parties and, therefore, how much of the current draft will be 
eventually in the agreement.  However, in spite of those difficulties, it is 
still possible to attempt an analysis of the provisions of ACTA still under 
negotiation. 
Probably because the EU has the strongest legal framework for 
protecting the rights to privacy and personal data protection, its authorities 
have reacted to and criticized the ACTA provisions for failing to provide 
adequate protection to those rights.  Analyzing, and even describing, the 
legal framework to protect privacy and personal data adopted by the EU is 
beyond the purpose of this paper.  Briefly, it provides a comprehensive 
legal regime for processing personal data related to physical persons, by 
automatic or manual process, for the public and private sectors.  In the 
communitarian level, this framework includes specific provisions in the 
Charter of Human Rights
41
 and several directives, such as the Data 
Protection Directive,
42
 the Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications,
43
 and the Data Retention Directive.
44
  As a general 
                                                 
37
  See, e.g., ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.18, and nn. 44, 47, 51, 59, 
and 61, (reserving the right to revisit elements of the draft later, but during the 
negotiations). 
38
  See, e.g., id. art. 2.18 nn, 46, 50, 52, and 53.  See also id. nn. 48 and 60 (defining 
terms). 
39
  See, e.g., id art. 2.18 and nn. 43, 49, 54, 57, and 58. 
40
  See, e.g., id art. 2.18 and nn. 55 and 56. 
41
  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 7 and 8, 2000 O.J (C 
364) 10. 
42
 Council Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 
[hereinafter Data Protection Directive]. 
43
  Directive 2002/58, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the 
Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37. 
44
  Directive 2006/24, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in Connection with the Provision of 
Publicly Available Electronic Communications Services or of Public 
Communications Networks and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 
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principle, the processing of personal data requires the express consent of the 
data subject, except for specific circumstances provided by domestic law, 
and independent national authorities guarantee the enforcement of the law.  
In February 2010, one month after a version of ACTA was leaked, the 
European Data Protection Supervisor issued an opinion expressing his 
concerns about potential incompatibility between envisaged ACTA 
measures and the requirements of the EU‟s data protection law.45  The 
Supervisor drew special attention to the provision dealing with the three 
strikes policy and the transfer of personal data to third countries, other than 
EU members, for purposes of intellectual property enforcement.  Later, in 
July 2010, the Data Protection Working Party (WP29), which meets the 
national authorities on the matter, sent a public letter to the European 
Commission.
46
  In its letter, the WP29 called attention to several of the 
proposed measures of ACTA interfering with the right to privacy, and 
called them into question for future negotiations.  We will refer to the 
concerns of the EU authorities through our analysis. 
The following pages describe the provisions of ACTA related with 
privacy and personal data, show how they connect with intellectual property 
enforcement, and analyze how they challenge the legal regime in force in 
countries that already have provided some protection to privacy and 
personal data, particularly those that are involved in the ongoing 
negotiations of the agreement. 
 
A. ACTA Makes a Serious and Unprecedented Concession of Privacy and 
Data Protection in favor of Intellectual Property Enforcement 
 
As was mentioned, ACTA makes several direct and indirect references 
to privacy and data protection, which are intended to balance them with 
intellectual property enforcement, unlike other major international 
instruments on intellectual property, which practically contain no mention 
of privacy and data protection.  The very mention of them could be 
understood as an achievement for privacy advocates, because ACTA at least 
recognizes the importance of privacy and data protection by adopting 
specific norms that regulate its possible conflict with enforcing the 
                                                                                                                            
54 [hereinafter Data Retention Directive]. 
45
  Opinions of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Current Negotiations by 
the European Union of an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 2010 O.J. (C 147) 1. 
46
  Letter from the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party to the Commissioner, Mr. 
Karel de Gucht, regarding the Data Protection and Privacy Implications of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement [ACTA] (July 15, 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/others/2010_07_15_letter_w
p_commissioner_de_gucht_acta_en.pdf. 
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intellectual property law.  However, in comparing ACTA with the TRIPS 
Agreement, those references seem to be a mere concession in favor of the 
enforcement. 
In effect, the TRIPS Agreements recognize not only the relevant 
international intellectual property agreements or conventions, but also the 
applicability of the basic principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) 1994 and, therefore, the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services, the multilateral treaties that set forth rules governing international 
trade in services, which the World Trade Organization (WTO) enforces.  
The latter includes a specific provision about general exceptions that allows 
countries to adopt of measures inconsistent with the Agreement when those 
measures are necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations 
related to the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the 
processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of 
confidentiality of individual records and accounts.
47
 
The mentioned general exception allows countries to develop public 
policies on several issues, without practical limitations, in fields such as 
safety, protection of the environment, public morals, to maintain public 
order, and personal data protection.
48
  ACTA, on the contrary, requires 
countries to adopt given measures against the privacy and personal data 
protection of the Internet users in order to enforce intellectual property laws.  
In other words, while previous regulations safeguard the adoption of 
measures to protect privacy and personal data by countries, the ACTA 
provisions require the implementation of measures that negatively affect 
that privacy and personal data protection. 
According to a still draft provision of ACTA, nothing in the agreement 
“shall require any party to disclose confidential information which would be 
contrary to . . . right of privacy.”49  This provision seems to safeguard the 
freedom of countries to provide an adequate level of protection for privacy 
and data protection.  However, the scope of this safeguard is not clear yet; 
some countries wish to limit its effects to chapters about international 
cooperation and enforcement practices, but not the chapter that creates a 
                                                 
47
  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), art. XX; and, General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), art. XIV c) (ii). 
48
  See PETER SWIRE & ROBERT LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS:  WORLD DATA FLOWS, 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 191 (1998) 
(explaining limitations to the exception, none of them referred to intellectual property 
enforcement). In fact, it abides by several tests set forth by Article XIV of the GATS 
in order to prevent an abuse of the exceptions.  See Council for Trade in Services, 
Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, Progress Report to the General Council, 
WTO document S/L/74 ¶ 14 (Jul. 27, 1999). 
49
  ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 4.3.2. 
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legal framework for enforcing intellectual property rights, which contains 
the riskiest provisions to privacy and personal data.  In addition, this 
provision protects privacy, but only under determined circumstances.
50
  As 
a result of those limitations, the mentioned safeguard does not prevent 
abuse in intellectual property enforcement or jeopardizing privacy and 
personal data protection. 
Only by the ninth round of negotiations, among the initial provisions, 
was a second relevant safeguard proposed.
51
  It also would allow parties to 
not disclose information related to privacy when that disclosure is “contrary 
to its law or its international agreements [and it] would prejudice law 
enforcement . . . or otherwise be contrary to public interest.”52  But, this 
safeguard, which is still under consideration,
53
 has a broader scope than the 
aforementioned, and seems more satisfactory for the purpose of preserving 
and developing public policies consistent with the right to privacy in 
domestic laws, especially in those countries that understand privacy and 
data protection as issues of public interest, beyond the mere protection of 
the person concerned by the information. 
In sum, ACTA has made a serious and unprecedented concession of 
privacy and data protection in favor of intellectual property enforcement by 
depriving countries of the freedom to adopt laws related to protecting the 
rights to privacy and personal data protection, and by requiring the 
implementation of measures that negatively could affect those rights.  In 
other words, ACTA does not prevent the adoption of public policies on 
privacy and data protection by countries, but certainly imposes some 
conditions on them.  Including a general safeguard in ACTA would help to 
preserve and develop some adequate protection in domestic law; however, it 
does not change that significant concession. 
 
B. ACTA Still Omits Appropriate Safeguards for the Right to Privacy in 
General. 
 
As previously discussed, the current text of ACTA does not include any 
                                                 
50
  Id. art. 4.3.2 (drafting a proposal that sets forth parties will be not required to disclose 
information which would “impede the enforcement” of its laws and regulations, 
including laws protecting the right to privacy.  Therefore, any other case, parties shall 
be required to). 
51
  See id. (expressing interest in including a general safeguard in favor of the right to 
privacy by the 8th round of negotiation, which seems quite late, given the importance 
of this right, particularly for the European Union).  
52
      Id. art. 1.4. 
53
  Id. n. 3 (mentioning that this provision is still subject to confirmation by the United 
States and the New Zealand delegations). 
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general provision that ensures that nothing in the agreement detracts from 
domestic legislation regarding the protection of personal privacy.  However, 
as was mentioned, there is a proposal to include a provision with that 
purpose,
54
 which unfortunately has not been confirmed by some negotiators 
yet.
55
  This norm is essential, given the concession that ACTA has made 
with privacy and data protection in favor of intellectual property 
enforcement and the absence of appropriated limitations and safeguards in 
other international instruments in both data protection and intellectual 
property regulation. 
It is possible to argue that other international instruments on human 
rights already protect the right to privacy and the right to personal data 
protection against a possible abusive enforcement of intellectual property 
laws, but, unfortunately, those instruments have limited effects.  Some of 
them have limited personal effects, such as the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union.
56
  Most of them are not legally binding
57
 
and, therefore, almost impossible to enforce.
58
  Others could be legally 
binding but have an extremely generic and ambiguous enunciation of those 
rights.
59
  In some countries, like in the U.S., human rights in general have a 
limited enforcement against the public sector, but not the private one.
60
  
In sum, the international instruments on human rights still are 
insufficient to provide adequate protection for the right to privacy and for 
the right to protection of personal data against the threat posed by the level 
of intellectual property enforcement encouraged by ACTA.  In addition, no 
                                                 
54
  Id. art. 1.4. 
55
  Id. 
56
  See Data Protection Directive, supra note 42. 
57
  See Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection 
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Council (Sept. 23, 
1980).  See also United Nations Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal Data 
Files, G.A. Res. 45/95, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/95 (Dec. 14, 1990); Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Privacy Framework, APEC XVI Ministerial Meeting, 
November 17-18, 2004, available at 
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/%2803995EABC73F94816C2A
F4AA2645824B%29~APEC+Privacy+Framework.pdf/$file/APEC+Privacy+Framew
ork.pdf. 
58
  These instruments would only be enforceable if they become customary norms, which 
seems difficult because they have been intended as a non-binding rules and mere 
recommendation for parties, denying opinio juris, an essential element for customary 
law.  
59
  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); U.N. Charter (Jun. 26, 1945). 
60
  For a limited number of cases in which the U.S. accepts enforcement of human rights 
against the private sector, see, e.g., The 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350 
(1988); Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); and, the Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codifying 
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international instrument in either data protection or intellectual property 
currently provides safeguards to reconcile the competing interests.  For 
those reasons, it seems indispensable to include, in the very text of ACTA, a 
general provision to ensure that nothing in the agreement detracts from 
domestic legislation regarding the protection of personal privacy. 
 
C. ACTA Grants Access to Internet Users‟ Personal Information for 
Intellectual Property Enforcement beyond Domestic Laws in Force 
 
Enforcing the law in the digital environment to address individual 
infringement requires the identification of infringers and, consequently, the 
collaboration of the online service providers (OSP) with the right holders.  
OSPs have been collecting and processing Internet users‟ personal data for a 
long time, initially for pricing purposes,
61
 later by law in order to contribute 
to criminal prosecution, especially with regard to so-called cyber crime.
62
  
Knowing the IP address,
63
 and the date and time of connection, OSPs are 
able to identify the connected computer.  Once knowing the connected 
computer, it is possible to correlate it with the Internet user‟s identity and 
his physical address.
64
 
Several provisions of ACTA persist in granting access to information 
that allows identifying supposed intellectual property infringers:  in relation 
to civil enforcement in general,
65
 to border measures,
66
 and in enforcing the 
                                                                                                                            
Filartiga). 
61
  Before offering Internet service access on a flat rate basis, companies used a price 
structure based in the amount of time of connection, a metered rate that depended on 
processing some Internet users‟ personal data for pricing purposes. 
62
  See Convention on Cybercrime, Budapest 23.XI.2001 (ETS No. 185) (Nov. 23, 
2001), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm 
[hereinafter Convention on Cybercrime];  Susan W. Brenner, The Council of Europe‟s 
Convention on Cybercrime, in CYBERCRIME: DIGITAL COPS IN A NETWORKED 
ENVIRONMENT 207 (Balkin ed., 2007) (arguing that country parties of the Convention 
have been unable to adopt even a common understanding on criminal prosecution; in 
fact, the agreement is not self-executing, does not provide a model legislation, allows 
reservation by parties, and fails to provide an adequate understanding of the privacy 
rules on the matter). 
63
  An IP address is a number assigned to any device (computer) connected to the 
Internet.  Sometimes that number varies according to the time of connection and is 
assigned on demand by the Internet service provider (dynamic IP address); in other 
instances that number is permanently linked to a given device (permanent IP 
addresses). 
64
  This tracking system allows the identification of computers rather than users.  In fact, 
in some cases it is necessary to adopt additional technical measures to identify a user, 
such as in open network (e.g., universities use a user name and password, while 
cybercafés use a register identifying users).  
65
  ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.4 (including a still in bracket 
provisions by the eighth round, which makes reservation in favor of domestic laws 
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law in digital environment.
67
  However, while in the first two cases, 
negotiators have approved the inclusion of express safeguards related to 
statutory provisions that regulate the processing of personal data and 
privacy laws, that did not happen in the third case;
68
 instead, in this case, a 
proposal emphasizes that parties shall enable right holders to 
“expeditiously” obtain from OSPs the necessary information to identity the 
subscriber that supposedly has infringed the law.
69
 
Many countries already have laws that allow the copyright holder to 
access such information from OSPs.
70
  However, the current text of ACTA 
goes beyond any domestic law by adopting an extremely broad concept of 
online service provider; by extending the scope of those provisions; and by 
omitting mention of any safeguards.  
The obligation to identify subscribers applies to any online service 
provider, which is defined by the same ACTA provision in the following 
terms: 
a provider of online services or network access, or the 
operators of facilities therefore, and includes an entity offering 
the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for 
digital online communications, between or among points 
specified by a user, of material of the user‟s choosing, without 
modification to the content of the material as sent or received.
71
  
 
This definition is broader than those available in comparative law, since it 
applies to any person, including physical persons, to any provider, even 
those that only provide access, and, not only to Internet based providers, but 
any online service. 
                                                                                                                            
that regulate processing of personal data). 
66
  Id. art. 2.13 (including an already approved reservation in favor of laws pertaining to 
the privacy or confidentiality of information).  
67
  Id. art. 2.18.3 ter. 
68
  See id.  According to the first leaked version, those safeguards, which appear 
approved by the second leaked version, were promoted by the European Union and 
Singapore, respectively. 
69
  See id. 
70
  This is not the case of all the countries involved in the ACTA negotiations.  In fact, 
Mexico does not have legal provisions related to liability of online service providers 
for copyright infringement, neither notice-and-takedown procedures nor rules related 
to identifying subscribers by online service providers for supposed copyright 
infringement. 
71
  It seems parties agree on the definition of online service provider, since, with the 
exception of a mere cosmetic Canadian proposal, no other proposal has been raised, 
and there is no record of opposition by any other country in any version of the 
agreement.  See, e.g., ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, n. 48.  
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In the U.S., procedures for taking down content and identifying users 
are limited to a service provider that is an “entity,”72 that is, “an 
organization (such as a business or a governmental unit) that has a legal 
identity apart from its members.”73  In other words, those procedures apply 
only to legal persons, but not to physical persons or human beings.  Instead, 
according to ACTA, those provisions shall apply to any provider, which 
“includes an entity.”  Therefore, at least in the case of the U.S. and 
countries that have adopted similar provisions to the DMCA in their 
FTAs,
74
 ACTA extends the duties, obligations, and cost of intellectual 
property enforcement not just to legal persons, but possibly to common 
people. 
In the U.S., according to the criterion of the Verizon case,
75
 the 
procedures to identify subscribers set forth by the DMCA do not grant 
access to information that allows identification of users by a mere access 
provider.
76
  In the EU, the E-Commerce Directive, which regulates the 
procedure to identify users, does not include mere providers of access, but 
those that provide storage services.
77
  Instead, ACTA would extend the 
obligation to identify users to firms that only provide access to networks in 
their capacity as conduit because ACTA does not make any distinction 
                                                 
72
  17 U.S.C. § 512(k) (2006). 
73
  BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
74
  The U.S. has included similar provisions in the Free Trade Agreements successively 
signed with Singapore, Chile, Morocco, Australia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic, Bahrain, Oman, Peru, 
Colombia, and Panama.  See United States Trade Representative, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements. 
75
  RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
76
  Commentators agree that the Verizon case has been a triumph for privacy advocates, 
but it has not seriously affected the copyright holders‟ policies because they still can 
issue subpoenas, which are available to any litigant who wants to sue an unknown 
defendant by filing against John Doe.  This mechanism provides more substantive and 
procedural protection for Internet users, but it is not enough to avoid misuse and 
abuse of the procedure.  As a result, according those commentators, even in the case 
of OSPs that provide mere access, copyright owners still have legal tools against 
infringers in the civil enforcement context.  See Alice Kao, RIAA v. Verizon:  
Applying the Subpoena Provision of the DMCA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 418, 
422-426 (2004); Thomas P. Owen & A. Benjamin Katz, RIAA v. Verizon Internet 
Services, Inc.:  Peer-to-Peer Networking Renders Section 512(h) Subpoenas under 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Obsolete, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 619, 632-
634 (2004). 
77
  Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in particular Electronic 
Commerce, in the Internal Market, art. 15.2, 2000 O.J. (L.178) 1.  But see Case C-
557-07, Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) - LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von 
Leistungsschutzrechte GmbH v Tele2 Telecommunication GmbH (Feb. 19, 2009) 
(deciding, in spite of the literal wording of the mentioned Directive, that the 
obligation to identify users could be imposed on access providers, even when they do 
no supply any other service). 
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related to this obligation,
78
 as opposed to the notice-and-take-down 
procedure,
79
 and to the kind of service provided by OSPs.
80
  Therefore, the 
implementation of this obligation could require a modification to the 
DMCA under U.S. law,
81
 domestic laws drafted according FTAs,
82
 and the 
EU Directive on E-Commerce. 
The definition of online service provider not only applies to any person 
and provider, even those that only provide access, but also to any online 
service, not only Internet based providers.  Instead, the EU law limits the 
collection of personal data generated or processed by “providers of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of a public 
communications network.”83  Therefore, ACTA could undermine this 
standard, by applying the obligations to online service providers that are not 
yet addressed in the current EU law, such as private network services.
84
 
The obligation to identify subscribers set forth by ACTA has a broad 
scope also. They seem not limited to copyright enforcement, but intellectual 
property; additionally, they extend not only to piracy and counterfeiting, as 
it was suggested by negotiating parties, but, also, to criminal and civil 
enforcement of intellectual property rights in general.  
By the ninth round of negotiations, it is still unclear whether the 
obligation to identify subscribers applies only to copyright and related 
rights or also to other intellectual property rights.  While the specific 
provision related to enforcement in the digital environment seems to limit 
the scope to trademarks, copyright, and related rights,
85
 the whole section 
refers to intellectual property rights, and some countries seem to be pushing 
for such a broad approach.
86
  The latter could be especially problematic for 
                                                 
78
  ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, arts. 2.18.3 ter and 2.18.3 quarter, and n. 
48. 
79
  Id. art. 2.18.3. See also, ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 8 art. 2.18.3 
(excluding from the notice and take down procedures those providers acting solely as 
a conduit). 
80
  See supra note 71. 
81
  17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
82
  This could be the case of Chile, which in May 2010 implemented the FTA signed 
with the U.S., imposing the obligation to identify users on ISPs other than those that 
provide mere access.  See Ley 17.336 sobre Propiedad Intelectual, [Copyright Act], as 
amended, Diario Oficial, 4 de Mayo de 2010 (Chile), arts. 5 y, 85 R, and 85 S. 
83
  Data Retention Directive, supra note 44, art. 3. 
84
  Curiously, it is possible to appreciate a disagreement between those countries that 
want to apply this section to “the Internet” (Mexico, Singapore, and the United States) 
and those that want to extend the scope to “digital environment” (the European Union 
and Switzerland), which are already the words in the provisional title of the whole 
section.  See ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.18.1. 
85
  Id. art. 2.18.3 ter. 
86
  Australia, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States support a 
scope limited to trademark, copyright and related rights, while the European Union, 
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the U.S., since the DMCA limits its provisions to enforce copyright and 
related rights; therefore, a full compliance with that scope of the ACTA 
provisions would force the adoption of legislative measures. 
In addition to the fact that the scope of the obligation to identify 
subscribers is still unclear, it is important to point out that they do not apply 
only to serious crime, either counterfeit or piracy, but to any criminal 
behavior.  Going beyond its declared purposes, ACTA requires identifying 
any infringer, even when the conduct is neither counterfeiting nor piracy.  
Although ACTA recognizes some gradation among criminal conduct,
87
 for 
purpose of identifying users, the agreement does not make any distinction 
and seems to apply to any criminal activity.  Given the initial purpose of the 
agreement and the lack of consensus about what constitutes a criminal 
offense,
88
 it seems necessary to introduce some gradation in the cases that 
authorize OSPs to identify users by limiting that procedure to criminal 
actions concerning counterfeiting and piracy.
89
 
The obligation to identify subscribers in ACTA applies not only in 
criminal enforcement, but also in civil enforcement.
90
  Neither the 
provisions that grant access to subscriber information, nor those related to 
the civil enforcement section of the agreement, which also apply to 
enforcing the law in the digital environment,
91
 exclude the obligation to 
identify Internet users from civil enforcement.  This is a troublesome scope, 
since most countries requires OSPs to retain traffic data for purposes of 
criminal prosecution, especially in the cases of so-called cyber crime,
92
 but 
such obligation does not apply to civil enforcement actions.  The underlying 
belief is that granting access to personal data of Internet users processed by 
OSPs jeopardizes human rights and the essential values of a democratic 
society, a risk that cannot be tolerated for mere civil enforcement of 
                                                                                                                            
Japan, and Switzerland a broader approach, which extends to all intellectual property 
rights.  Id. art. 2.18.1. 
87
  E.g., id. arts. 2.14.1 (referring to criminal offenses in “cases of willful trademark 
counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial scale”), 2.16.3 
(mentioning “indictable offenses” and “serious offenses”), and 2.17 (referring to 
“cases of significant public interest”). Also, see id. art. 2.X (providing an exception to 
border measures in case of di minimis infringement, which is not the case for granting 
access to personal data related to a supposed infringer). 
88
  Id. art. 2.14.1. 
89
  Id. nn. 20, 21, 23 and 24 (providing concepts for both counterfeit trademark goods 
and pirated copyright goods, which, however, are considerable broad and require 
some changes in order to rationalize the scope of the criminal enforcement provisions 
yet).  
90
  Id. art. 2.18.1. 
91
  Id. art. 2.4. 
92
  See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 62, art. 14. 
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intellectual property rights that, after all, according to the TRIPS 
Agreement, are private rights.
93
 
In the case of the EU, for example, the Data Retention Directive 
requires providers to process subscribers‟ personal data for purpose of the 
investigation, detection, and prosecution of serious crime.
94
  However, 
according to the decision of European Court of Justice in the Promusicae 
case.
95
  Community law does not set forth a specific obligation upon EU 
members to guarantee access to Internet users‟ personal data to copyright 
holder in civil enforcement actions, but Community law does allow the 
adoption of this kind of measure in the domestic law.
96
  In sum, for the EU, 
although it would be permitted by Community law, ACTA would require 
adopting a law that obliges providers to identify subscribers for purposes of 
civil enforcement.
97
 
In sum, ACTA would grant access to the personal information of 
subscribers held by providers for intellectual property enforcement beyond 
the domestic laws in force.  According to the initial purposes of ACTA, it is 
recommended to expressly limit the scope of such access to information, for 
example, by limiting that access to cases of criminal actions in counterfeit 
and piracy and, therefore, excluding civil enforcement actions. 
 
D. ACTA omits appropriate safeguards for the right to personal data 
protection in providing access to personal information of Internet users. 
 
As was previously mentioned, ACTA grants access to Internet users‟ 
personal information for purposes of intellectual property enforcement.  
However, ACTA fails to provide enough measures to protect the rights of 
concerned people from an abusive use of that access mechanism.  On the 
contrary, ACTA seems to privilege expeditious access to data, without 
                                                 
93
  See supra note 35. 
94
  Data Retention Directive, supra note 44, art. 1. 
95
  ECJ Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de 
España SAU (Jan. 29, 2008). 
96
  Contra Ramón Casas Vallés, A la Caza del Pirata P2P:  El Necesario Equilibrio 
entre el Derecho de Autor y el Derecho a la Protección de la Intimidad, WIPO 
MAGAZINE (Spanish version), April 2008, at 10-11 (suggesting that the message of 
ECJ is that the EU members are not required to impose such kind of obligation in 
civil procedures, but it is recommended).  But see, Ramón Casas Vallés, Pursuing the 
P2P Pirates:  Balancing Copyright and Privacy Rights, WIPO MAGAZINE (English 
version), April 2008, at 10-11 (providing a right understanding of the implications of 
Promusicae case). 
97
  See also supra note 46 (calling the attention of the WP29 about the different scope of 
the ACTA provisions and the European Union law). 
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mentioning either substantive or procedural safeguards.
98
 
Negotiators recently have included an article in ACTA that safeguards 
domestic privacy laws.  However, that general statement is insufficient to 
protect privacy and personal data processing properly in the context of 
intellectual property enforcement online.  Specifically, ACTA fails to 
provide any provisions that set forth how much time OSPs should keep 
subscribers‟ personal data, procedures that properly guarantee the rights of 
concerned subscribers, or even which data should be kept.
99
  It also has 
been noted by the EU authorities
100
 that ACTA does not adopt any temporal 
limitation for the processing of personal data by Internet service providers, 
which is another possible conflict with EU law.
101
 
The absence of appropriate safeguards is contrary to the high standards 
of protection adopted by the EU, and even the minimal formal requirements 
provided by the DMCA in the U.S.  In the EU, according to the European 
Court of Justice, members that wish to implement into domestic law a 
mechanism to identify Internet users must balance fundamental rights, and 
national authorities must interpret their domestic laws in a manner 
consistent with fundamental rights, and with the other general principles of 
Community law, such as the principle of proportionality.
102
  In the U.S., 
even the most expeditious procedure to identify a supposed infringer 
provided by the DMCA has some minimal required showings,
103
 which 
basically require filing a couple of documents.
104
  Even these minimal 
safeguards are absent in ACTA.  
Added to the lack of harmonization between ACTA provisions and both 
the EU and the U.S. domestic laws, the absence of explicit safeguards in the 
agreement can become a serious problem in its own implementation, 
particularly for those countries lacking adequate technical assistance.  It is a 
well-known fact that some countries implement their international 
commitments, especially with regard to technical issues, in a word-by-word 
legal fashion.  For that reason, it is recommended to include some specific 
                                                 
98
  ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.18. 3 ter. 
99
  Some of those safeguards (and useful boundaries) are usual in other instruments, 
particularly in the European Union law.  See, e.g., Data Retention Directive, supra 
note 44; see also Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 62. 
100
  See supra note 46. 
101
  Data Retention Directive, supra note 44, art. 6. 
102
  See ECJ Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. 
Telefónica de España SAU (Jan. 29, 2008). 
103
  See Julie E. Cohen et al., Copyright & Privacy – Through the Privacy Lens, 4 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 273, 273 et seq. (2005) (arguing that the relevant 
DMCA‟s provisions are excessively permissive and threats seriously the privacy); See 
also Owen & Katz, supra note 76, at 620; and, Kao, supra note 76, at 410. 
104
  17 U.S.C. §512(h)(2) (2006). 
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provisions in ACTA that give a common level of protection for the rights to 
privacy and personal data.  In this point, following the aforementioned 
criteria of the European Court of Justice seems to be the most appropriate 
decision. 
 
E. ACTA Provides Legal Support for Implementing the Polemical Three 
Strikes Policy, a Measure that Raises Several Concerns from a Human 
Rights Perspective. 
 
The three strikes policy, also known as the graduated response, is a 
measure of domestic law that allows the disconnection of a supposed 
infringing Internet user for a given period of time, after the user has 
received warning with successive notices about copyright infringements 
committed through his or her Internet account.  At the time this paper was 
written, only a handful of countries had passed laws adopting three strikes 
provisions, including France,
105
 South Korea,
106
 Taiwan,
107
 the United 
Kingdom,
108
 and New Zealand.
109
  
The French three strikes law was introduced by Sarkozy‟s government, 
and it is probably the most illustrative case about how polemical this policy 
can be.  The bill generated serious concerns in the French data protection 
authority related to the protection of Internet users‟ personal data.110  Later, 
once adopted by the legislature, the law was declared unconstitutional by 
the Constitutional Council
111
 because it infringed the right to due process of 
law by allowing an administrative authority to impose sanctions,
112
 by-
                                                 
105
  Bill to support the diffusion and protection of content on the Internet, also known as 
HADOPI Act, because the acronym of the Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des 
Oeuvres et la Protection des droits sur Internet, the name of the administrative agency 
that supervises its compliance. 
106
  Art. 133 bis, South Korean Copyright Act, modified in April 2009. 
107
  Art. 90 quinquies, Taiwanese Copyright Act, modified in May 2009. 
108
  Digital Economy Act, 2010, c. 24 (Eng.). 
109
  The Copyright (New Technologies) Amendment Act, adopted in April 2008, 
modified the copyright law by adopting a three strikes provision, which was later 
modified by the Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Bill, 2010. 
110
  Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés, Délibération no. 2008-101 du 
29 avril 2008 portant avis sur le projet de loi relatif à la Haute Autorité pour la 
diffusion des œuvres et la protection des droits sur Internet (avis no. 08008030), 
published unofficially as La Loi Antipiratage: le Gouvernement Critiqué par la CNIL, 
published in La Tribune, 3 November 2008, available at 
http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises/communication/telecom--
internet/20081103trib000305843/loi-antipiratage-le-gouvernement-critique-par-la-
cnil-.html (last visited: August 30, 2010). 
111
  Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council], decision no. 2009-580, Jun. 10, 
2009. 
112
  Id. ¶ 16. 
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passing the presumption of innocence by requiring the subscriber to prove 
he or she has not committed an infringement,
113
 and the right of free speech 
because “in the current state of affairs . . . the participation in democratic 
life and expression of ideas and opinions includes the freedom to access to 
those services (Internet).”114  Eventually, the unconstitutionality was 
remedied by the French Parliament, which empowered courts to disconnect 
Internet users.
115
  However, after one year in force, no one has been warned 
of infringement nor disconnected; as Jérémie Zimmermann, the 
spokesperson of La Quadrature du Net, a French advocacy group that 
promotes rights and freedoms on the Internet, said, the law has created a 
“big tax-sponsored spam machine.”116 
The French three strikes law also affected the communitarian level.  In 
fact, Sarkozy‟s initiative created a conflict between the European 
Commission, then under the presidency of the French government, and the 
European Parliament in the context of the adoption of the Telecom Package. 
The conflict eventually was solved by adopting an amendment resisted by 
Sarkozy‟s government, which requires that “measures taken by countries 
regarding end-users' access . . . shall respect the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of natural persons, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and general 
principles of community law.”117 
The leaked versions of ACTA included an explicit mention of the three 
strikes laws in footnotes, as an example of a policy to address the 
unauthorized storage or transmission of materials protected by copyright or 
related rights that could be adopted and reasonably implemented by OSPs in 
order to qualify for the limitation of liability related to online material.
118
  
The content of that footnote has been deleted in the official version of 
ACTA, but ACTA still keeps provisions to support the three strikes policy.  
Therefore, with or without explicit mention in footnotes, even when ACTA 
does not require the adoption of three strikes laws, it provides legal support 
for implementing this polemical measure. 
                                                 
113
  Id. ¶ 17.  Interestingly, this is a common feature of all the three strikes laws already 
adopted:  the user is presumed guilty in advance and, therefore, she must probe being 
innocent, in spite of her technical limitations. 
114
  Id. ¶ 12. 
115
  Assemblée Nationale, Projet de Loi relatif à la protection pénale de la propriété 
littéraire et artistique sur Internet (Sept. 22, 2009). 
116
  Hadopi is dead: "three strikes" buried by highest court, La Quadrature (Paris), Jun. 
10, 2009, http://www.laquadrature.net/fr/hadopi-is-dead-three-strikes-killed-by-
highest-court. 
117
  Council Directive 2009/140, art. 1 (1) (b), 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37. 
118
  See ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 8, n. 29; See also European Union 
Directorate-General For Trade, ACTA Negotiations (Sept. 30, 2009), Ref. 588/09. 
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In addition to human rights concerns, disconnecting Internet users, as 
ACTA suggests, should be especially cumbersome for countries that 
already have recognized the rights to access to Internet and/or to 
broadband.
119
  But it is not just the sanction of disconnection itself that 
causes concern, but also the lack of substantive and procedural safeguards 
for supposed infringers.  For example, ACTA does not impose a general 
monitoring requirement on OSPs,
120
 but the very implementation of a three 
strikes provision requires some processing of personal data without 
authorization of the data subject; again, ACTA fails in providing a 
minimum legal framework for such data processing.  In this point, given 
that the appropriate operation of a three strikes policy requires identifying a 
supposed infringer, all the comments made previously are also valid here. 
The European authorities on data protection have analyzed the ACTA 
provisions on three strikes and their negative effects on the right to privacy. 
According to the European Data Protection Supervisor and the WP29,
121
 the 
current text of ACTA at the very least encourages the implementation of the 
controversial three strikes policy.  They argued that the agreement should 
include some “minimum standards for the enforcement,” and called to 
attention that large scale monitoring or systematic recording of data would 
be contrary to the EU law. 
Any explicit reference to the three strikes policy should be avoid in 
ACTA because it could be used as a argument to force countries to 
implement such a polemical measure.  Otherwise, given its intrinsic 
punitive nature, the three strikes policy should be brought into compliance 
with the basic principles of criminal and human rights law, such as nullum 
poena sine legem (principle of legality), non bis in idem (prohibition of 
double incrimination), the presumption of innocence, and the due process of 
law.  Therefore, similar to what the French Constitutional Council and the 
Telecom Package have done,
122
 a direct or indirect reference to such policy 
should be mitigated with express allusion to substantive and procedural 
safeguards with respect to the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons. 
 
                                                 
119
  See Finland makes broadband a „legal right,‟BBC (London), Jul. 1, 2010, available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10461048 (last visited: August 30, 2010) (reporting 
that Finland recently has become the first one to recognize access to the Internet as a 
legal right).  
120
  ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.18.3 bis. 
121
  See supra notes 45 & 46. 
122
  See supra notes 111 &117. 
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F. ACTA promotes cooperation between rights holders and ISPs without 
regard for the rights of third parties, like the right to privacy and 
protection of personal data of customers. 
 
A still unapproved article of ACTA requires parties to promote the 
development of mutually supportive relationships between OSPs and rights 
holders to deal with intellectual property infringement online, including 
encouraging the establishment of guidelines.
123
  In this context, promoting 
self-regulation seems an adequate manner to deal with the continuous 
changes and challenges of the technological environment, and with the 
usual delay of legal solutions. However, again ACTA fails in not providing 
any safeguards for the right of third parties, particularly the Internet end-
users. 
It is important to note here that the self-regulatory approach has been 
used in some countries, such as the United Kingdom
124
 and Ireland,
125
 to 
promote the adoption of three strikes policies by the OSPs.  Under pressure 
from copyright holders and with the implicit agreement of governments, 
OSPs have modified their contracts with subscribers to include clauses that 
legitimate the disconnection of users for supposed copyright infringements. 
Unfortunately, this self-regulation has not protected customers‟ rights 
appropriately.  ACTA should take advantage of these experiences and 
include safeguards against abusive self-regulatory practices. 
 
G. ACTA Emphasizes the Protection of Effective Technological Measures, 
but Still Does Not Afford Protection for the Privacy and Personal Data 
of Users Affected by Such Measures. 
 
The ACTA negotiators have provided a significant increase in the legal 
protection of the effective technological measures beyond the standard 
adopted in the WIPO Internet Treaties.
126
  Before the public official release 
of ACTA, it required not only adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies, but also civil remedies or criminal penalties,
127
 an excess that 
                                                 
123
  ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.18.3 quater. 
124
  See Eleanor Dallaway, Music Piracy Born Out of a „Something for Nothing‟ Society, 
INFOSECURITY 17-20 (Apr. 2008); Christian L. Castle & Amy E. Mitchell, What‟s 
Wrong With ISP Music Licensing?, 26 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 4, 7 (2008). 
125
  Karlin Lillington, Putting Up Barriers to a Free and Open Internet, THE IRISH TIMES, 
April 16, 2010. 
126
  See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997), art. 11; World Intellectual Property 
Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997), art. 18. 
127
ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.18.4. 
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does not appear in the current draft of ACTA.  But, ACTA still requires the 
adoption of those remedies independent of any infringement of copyright or 
related rights.
128
  Also, similar to the DMCA,
129
 ACTA still requires 
adopting anti-circumventing and anti-trafficking provisions,
130
 the latter of 
which implies serious difficulties in making real the possible safeguards 
that a country “may” adopt in benefits of certain exceptions and limitations 
to copyright and related rights.
131
  Unfortunately, unlike the DMCA and the 
FTAs signed by the U.S. with several countries, ACTA does not provide 
even a minimum list of those exceptions.  
Analyzing the provisions about legal protection of the effective 
technological measures is beyond the purpose of this paper.  However, it is 
appropriate to mention that those provisions again fail in including any 
limitation that guarantees the adequate protection of the rights to privacy 
and personal data protection.  Including a provision that provides safeguards 
for those rights is necessary insofar as the technological measures require 
personal data of people who use or access to the protected works. 
 
H. ACTA omits provisions to safeguard the protection of personal data in 
cross-border transferences of such data. 
 
The whole purpose of getting compliance with intellectual property 
rules and enforcing them requires, to some extent, interchanging personal 
information among parties, such as copyright holder and supposed 
infringers‟ data.  This is especially true in the case of online infringements; 
overcoming the limitations of territorial-based domestic laws demands a 
global answer, which calls for international cooperation in the enforcement 
of the law.  In the case of ACTA, it sets forth that countries that adhere to 
the agreement shall share relevant information
132
 and adopt some 
enforcement practices.
133
  Unfortunately, there is no provision that 
safeguards that an adequate level of protection shall be provided to the 
personal data that is transferred from one country to another. In other 
words, ACTA forgets the existence of rules that regulate the cross-border 
transference of personal data. 
Several countries already have personal data protection laws, which 
                                                 
128
 ACTA Draft – Jul. 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.18.5. 
129
  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(1)(A) (2006) (including anti-circumvention provisions); 17 
U.S.C. §1201(a)(2) (2006) (including anti-trafficking provisions). 
130
  ACTA Draft – Jul 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.18.4. 
131
  Id. art. 2.18 X. 
132
  Id. art. 3.2. 
133
  Id. Ch. 4 Enforcement Practices. 
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balance the protection of people‟s privacy with the free flow of information.  
However, as it was understood early on by the European countries, the very 
purpose of having strong domestic protection could be eroded if personal 
data is transferred to countries with no protection; cross-border 
transferences of personal data to places where there is not an adequate level 
of protection circumvents the objective of data privacy laws.  Therefore, it 
is necessary to adopt some limitations to those transfers, which 
unfortunately ACTA does not do. 
It is not by chance that the European Data Protection Supervisor has 
raised the lack of provisions on cross-border transfers of personal data in 
ACTA.
134
  There have been some attempts to regulate those transfers in 
international fora through legal harmonization, but their successes, if they 
exist, have been limited.
135
  But, this has not been the case of the EU.  Since 
the early „80s,136 the EU has built an increasing level of protection for 
personal data in its internal market, which has been catapulted through the 
adoption of several directives on the matter.
137
  Basically, this legal 
framework assumes an “equivalent” level of protection among the EU 
members, which cannot block transfers in the internal market;
138
 and, 
requires an “adequate” level of protection to third countries in order to 
authorize transfers of data to them.
139
  Therefore, apart from some limited 
exceptions,
140
 transferring personal data to third countries that do not 
provide adequate level of protection, which is the case of all the countries 
involved in the ACTA negotiations, is banned. 
It seems that the ACTA negotiators have avoided acknowledging the 
fact that a satisfactory solution for transferences of personal data is required 
for intellectual property enforcement in the agreement.  This is hardly a 
small point, especially for the European authorities that are more concerned 
with the protection of European citizens, and particularly their right to 
privacy.  In fact, two of the main political conflicts between the European 
Parliament and the European Commission, which is negotiating ACTA, 
have been the result of the most sympathetic engagement of the former than 
the latter in protecting the right to privacy:  first, when the Parliament 
                                                 
134
  See supra note 45. 
135
  See supra note 57. 
136
  See Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data, Strasbourg, January 28, 1981 (attempting for first time the 
harmonization of personal data protection law among countries; in this case, countries 
of the European community). 
137
  See supra notes 42, 43, and 44. 
138
  Data Protection Directive, supra note 42, at 8, 9. 
139
  Id. at 56, 57, 59, 60; and art. 25. 
140
  Id. art. 26. 
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rejected the agreement between the Commission and the U.S. to transfer 
personal data of air passengers; later, when the Parliament adopted a 
provision against the three strike policy in the Telecom Package against the 
Commission‟s desires.  These facts show that privacy is a serious issue for 
European authorities, which ACTA negotiators have not weighed properly. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS 
 
Authorizing any intrusion into the privacy and personal data protection 
of Internet users under the guise of intellectual property enforcement is 
disproportionate, and allows an excessive misuse and abuse of disclosed 
information, which jeopardizes not just the right to privacy, but also an 
essential requirement for a democratic society.  But, at the same time, 
denying access to information that is required to identify an infringer, 
particularly the author of a serious infringement, is excessive.  ACTA has 
had to balance the competing interests in this dilemma: the rights to privacy 
and the protection of personal data with intellectual property rights. 
The concessions of ACTA in privacy exceed the very purpose of the 
treaty, which pretends to be limited to fighting counterfeiting and piracy, 
but instead it includes provisions intended to enforce the law against 
citizens.  Those serious and unprecedented concessions omit appropriate 
substantive and procedural safeguards for the right to privacy of Internet 
users.  Instead of limiting the access to personal data to serious crimes, 
ACTA grants access to personal information beyond domestic laws in force. 
Even other international instruments that have been criticized seriously for 
being intrusive on privacy, such as the Convention on Cybercrime and the 
FTAs, seem more protective on the matter.  
In addition, ACTA provides legal support for implementing the 
polemical three strikes policy, a measure that raises several concerns from a 
human rights perspective, and promotes cooperation between right holders 
and ISPs without regard to the rights of third parties, such as the right to 
privacy and protection of personal data of customers.  The same can be said 
about the provisions related to the protection of effective technological 
measures, which do not afford any protection for the privacy and personal 
data of users affected by them.  
An additional serious problem arises in the harmonization of the 
provisions of ACTA, which implicitly allow transferences of personal 
information among the parties, and the EU requirements for trans-border 
flow of personal data. Currently, none of the negotiating parties satisfy the 
EU “adequate” level of protection to allow transferences of personal data; 
therefore, national and communitarian authorities on data protection in the 
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EU could block any transference of such data for intellectual property 
enforcement. And, even worse for the intentions of negotiators, it can 
become an obstacle for the adoption of ACTA by the European Parliament. 
ACTA fails not only in providing adequate protection for the rights to 
privacy and the protection of personal data, but also in addressing its very 
purpose, in providing a harmonizing international instrument to fight 
against counterfeiting and piracy.  For example, ACTA attempts to enforce 
any use of a copyrighted work in the digital environment, without affording 
the recognized problem of lack of harmonization in either limitation or 
exception to intellectual property rights and the exhaustion of those rights.  
Intellectual property rights are essentially private rights and hardly can 
override the rights to privacy and personal data protection, which have an 
intrinsic social value, particularly in democratic societies.  Hardly, but not 
impossibly.  Unfortunately, ACTA makes mistakes when it overrides its 
own purpose, by unnecessary diminishing the right to privacy and the right 
to protection of personal data, to provide enforcement not against smugglers 
and pirates, but against ordinary citizens. 
 
 
